Identity Crisis

Syria's condition is critical.

December 2010. It was business as usual when a certain Muḥammad Būʿazīzī set himself on fire and unwittingly released a hurricane that would claim the presidents of Tunis and Egypt and inaugurate a series of demonstrations in Bahrain, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere. Būʿazīzī was the Arab World’s Gavrilo Princip, who did no more than light the fuse to initiate a chain reaction and release the immense energy of a deceptively silent volcano.

Still unfolding, the Arab Spring—an expression to be accepted with caution if at all—is not the subject of this post; Syria is. 

What is Syria? Etymologically it was the name the Greeks—and subsequently the Romans—loosely applied to the area bound to the north by Asia Minor, to the south by the Arabian Desert, and to the west by the Mediterranean Sea. It was a geographical, not a geopolitical, designation; its boundaries changed a great deal throughout the long history of the Near East. The same area would be called “Bilād aš-Šām" by the Arabs; that is, the country located to the north of Hijaz as opposed to “Yemen,” which referred to the south, and the Levant (from soleil levant, or east, as opposed to the west, or soleil couchant) by the French.

As every schoolkid in Syria knows, modern Syria was a creation of France in the aftermath of WWI. The Near East was carved by Mark Sykes and Georges Picot on behalf of the British and the French empires into mandates and spheres of influence. France was accorded the mandate for Syria, including Lebanon (a hundred years ago the Lebanese called themselves Syrians, but that’s another story), and Britain those for Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine.

According to Syria’s official history, the French proceeded with a deliberate policy of “divide and conquer” right from the start. The country was partitioned into six different entities: the States of Aleppo, Damascus, Drūze, al-ʿAlawīyyīn, Greater Lebanon, and Alexandretta. The last one was eventually ceded to Turkey, and Lebanon (enlarged by four “Syrian” districts) was kept separate even after administrative and financial considerations convinced the French of the desirability of unifying the remaining four statelets into one “Syria.”

In their political and administrative divisions, the French emphasized Syria's religious differences. I say "emphasized," for certainly they did not create those differences. The Maronite Christians were given Lebanon (enlarged by the aforementioned “Syrian” districts to make it economically viable); the Alawites were made “independent,” and so were the Drūze; and the rival cities of Aleppo and Damascus were each granted its own realm. The partition, to be sure, had many flaws, as was bound to happen in an ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse country the way Syria was and still is. There was an important Kurdish concentration in al-Jazīrā, to name but one example. As for Syria’s Christians, they were too scattered across the emerging country to be granted their own dominion. The French probably debated those issues and more but could not come up with a definitive remedy. They realized, and so did their embittered Syrian subjects, that the division was artificial but reckoned that it would be impossible to come up with a solution that satisfies everyone and did not suspect at the time that they would soon be evicted from the Levant and lose control over the subsequent development of their creatures.

Syria became fully independent in 1946. Alexandretta and Lebanon were lost, it is true, but the rest of the country remained united and was now a full-fledged state, a member of the United Nations, and governed by its own people. Its borders, with the exception of the Golan Heights lost to Israel in 1967, have seemingly stabilized and acquired permanence through the recognition of its neighbors as well as the international community. Those borders, however, have always been denounced by Syrian patriots of different political orientations as artificially imposed by foreigners. For better or for worse, Syrians kept looking beyond their borders in search of a Greater Syria, a Fertile Crescent, an Arab Nation, etc. Generations of Syrians were sustained on an imaginary diet of a Syria that never was.

Fast forward to March 2011, when the fever of the so-called “Arab Spring” reached Syria. It is not my intention to elaborate on Syria’s simmering civil war, as the final chapter in that sad narrative is yet to be written, and I fear we’re in for a long ride. Suffice it to point out the increasingly ethnic-sectarian nature of the current strife. Whereas our parents and grandparents incessantly raised the banner of Arab or Syrian union, a sizable part—some think a majority—of the current generation appears hopelessly divided along sectarian lines and utterly bent on settling scores and pursuing vendettas. Some have even gone to the extent of asking help from the same “colonial” powers that our grandparents denounced and “evicted.”

Is this surprising? Well, it shouldn’t be. One only needs to look next door at the Lebanese and Iraqi models. Of course, in both cases outside intervention played a crucial—in Iraq’s case a decisive—role, but there is no denying that the soil was fertile with sectarian hatred that was bound to explode with outright war when a timely stimulus came. More to the point, if tiny Lebanon can plunge into a bloody civil war for almost a generation, why wouldn’t Syria, several times Lebanon’s size area-wise as well as population-wise and just as complex from ethnic and religious standpoints?

Are Syria’s borders artificial? Absolutely! But this can be interpreted in two diametrically opposite manners, and an inescapable conclusion would be that the French may have created a Syria that is too large for its own good after all. Why not re-partition Syria, give the Kurds the Northeast, the Druze the Southwest, and the Alawites the coast? It may not sound pretty, but it definitely is better than endless fighting and bloodshed, and it sure as hell beats any “humanitarian” military intervention by the cynical western powers and a NATO that has all but outlived its usefulness. If, and that’s a big if, it could be done peacefully.

I don’t know what the solution is. I don’t know if a reasonably accepted one even exists. Anyone who practiced medicine long enough knows that not all diseases are curable, “miracles” of modern science and technology notwithstanding. Can Syria be kept united with no recourse to violence? Would a day dawn on this tormented land when Syrians love their country, however artificially created, more than they distrust and resent each other?

There has never been a shortage of dreamers singing Syria’s praises and professing an everlasting love for their fatherland, but what is desperately needed are responsible leaders and enlightened citizenry willing and capable of making difficult decisions and living with their consequences, however painful in the short run. Syria needs less poetry and more action.

　
　

ʾAsād Crosses the Rubicon

Syria was in turmoil as I arrived in Damascus shortly after the Ides of March 2011. Demonstrators in Darʿā spearheaded a movement demanding nothing less than comprehensive reforms, including—but not limited to—removal of emergency laws, releasing political prisoners, clamping down on corruption, and dismissing venal officials. Some even raised sectarian banners and questioned the very legitimacy of the president. Within days, various regions in the country joined the upheaval, and the regime appeared more than ever on the defensive, fighting for its very survival.

Ḥāfiẓ al-ʾAsād faced a similar uprising starting in the late 1970s that culminated in the Ḥamā Massacre in February 1982, when he unleashed his armed forces on the city, killing thousands of people and leveling the center of the old town. Back then such wholesale repression was facilitated by a multiplicity of factors: Syria then enjoyed the protection of the still mighty Soviet Empire, her armed forces were in much better shape, and there was no Facebook, Internet, cell phones, or satellite TV. No photographs, let alone video clips, leaked out to tell the gruesome tale. ʾAsād Senior was brutal but efficient. The Ḥamā tragedy guaranteed his reign till the closure of the 20th century and provided for a smooth transmission of power to his son in the year 2000.

Baššār al-ʾAsād possessed none of the above advantages. The Syria of 2011 was surrounded by enemies. To the south loomed Israel and Jordan, to the east US-occupied Iraq, and to the west a Lebanon that no longer hosted the Syrian armed forces. Regionally Saudi Arabia pursued a hostile policy vis-à-vis the Syria-Iran axis, and globally the USA targeted ʾAsād with sanctions. The Soviet Union was a distant memory. Economically Syria suffered from poverty, a widening gap between rich and poor, dilapidated infrastructure, depleted oil reserves, water shortages, and overpopulation.

ʾAsād Junior could no longer let loose the army against the opposition without risking the wrath of the USA and NATO, as the case in Libya amply demonstrated; at the same time, he had to be proactive and shun the half-hearted incremental measures that sealed the fate of Tunisia’s president and Egypt’s despot. Bahrain’s monarch was luckier, but he enjoyed the favor and protection of the USA and Saudi Arabia. Syria's crisis called for tact and discretion so as to avoid repeating the mistakes that doomed Arab dictators elsewhere. Could Damascus pull a rabbit out of the president's worn-out hat?

To be sure, ʾAsād possessed some advantages. Contrary to his Egyptian erstwhile colleague, he still had the army as well as the security apparatuses firmly lined up behind him. Most Alawites and many Sunnis still supported him. The former to preserve their acquired advantages and the latter to avoid chaos and sectarian strife Iraqi-style that would likely follow reversal of fortunes. Christians certainly were in no mood to have Muslim extremists topple a relatively secular Alawite rule, and neither were probably Druze and Ismailis. Apart from the Kurds, minorities would by and large support ʾAsād, each for its own reasons.

Left to his own devices, ʾAsād surely has more assets than liabilities and would probably not have much more difficulty suppressing the uprisings than his old man did 30 years prior; his dilemma was that he could no longer count on outsiders leaving him in “peace,” especially after witnessing the USAF pounding Libya in the company of the British and the French. His options were sharply reduced to finding the magic formula of sufficient repression to intimidate the rebels without reaching a threshold that would invite outside intervention.

For more than a week, ʾAsād dealt with the opposition with relative restraint, avoiding large-scale bloodshed and leaving the task of keeping order to the police and security forces. The army surrounded Darʿā, to be sure, but stopped short of deploying its guns. He moreover delegated his spokesperson, Dr. Buṯaynā Šaʿbān, to announce imminent reforms, including the promise to increase the salaries of government employees. ʾAsād even released some political prisoners and let it be known that he would be addressing the nation soon. He was biding his time and prudently avoided commitment to a course of action with unforeseen consequences.

The proverbial light at the end of the tunnel appeared on March 27th as US Secretary of State Clinton called ʾAsād “a reformer,“ essentially ruling out military intervention against Syria. To be sure there was no shortage of condemnation of using violence against civilians by different influential figures in the US administration and Congress, but ʾAsād could safely ignore verbal attacks stripped of military force or the threat of its use. Secretary Clinton delivered precisely what he was asking for, and he could, at least for the time being, afford to talk and act with far more confidence than would be the case for someone under an American Sword of Damocles. Instructions were given to the powers that be to organize huge demonstrations in support of the regime, with tens of thousands filling the streets of major Syrian cities waving and repeating resurrected, worn-out slogans of undying loyalty to the president.

Thus emboldened, ʾAsād delivered on March 30th his long-awaited address to the obsequious People’s Assembly in Damascus. The speech blamed the disturbances on outside conspiracies and made no real concessions to the people’s demands, a few vague promises notwithstanding. It was a triumphant speech received by a standing ovation from a dependable audience and interrupted here and there by deputies outdoing each other in flattery and brown-nosing as ʾAsād appeared and sounded more relaxed than ever. It was veni, vidi, vici as Syria's president donned the mantle of Julius Caesar.