Friday, September 23, 2011

Identity Crisis

The proverbial Sword of Damocles is hanging over Syria.

It was business as usual all over the Arab World when a certain Muhammad Bouazizi set himself on fire back in December 2010 to unwittingly release a hurricane that in no time claimed the presidents of Tunis and Egypt and inaugurated a series of demonstrations in Bahrain, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere. Bouazizi was the Arab World’s Gavrilo Princip who did no more than lighting the fuse to initiate a chain reaction that would perhaps have happened sooner or later to release the immense energy of a deceptively silent volcano.

The Arab Spring is not the subject of my essay, for it is still unfolding. In fact the very expression “Arab Spring” should be accepted with caution, if at all. The players and playfields are quite different across the Arab World and what may apply to Egypt would not necessarily apply to Syria. This essay is about Syria and only Syria but I wish it was that simple.
 
To begin with, what is Syria? Well from an etymological standpoint, “Syria” was the name the Greeks (and subsequently the Romans) loosely applied to the area bound to the North by Asia Minor, to the South by the Arabia Desert, to the West by the Mediterranean Sea. It was a geographical, not a geopolitical designation and its boundaries changed a great deal throughout the long history of the Near East. The same area would be called “Bilad il Sham” by the Arabs (that is the country located to the North of Hijaz as opposed to “Yemen” that referred to the South) and the Levant (from soleil levant or east as opposed to the west or soleil couchant) by the French.

As every school kid in Syria knows (but not many Syrians admit), modern Syria was a creation of France in the aftermath of WWI. The Near East was carved by Mister Mark Sykes and Monsieur Georges Picot on behalf of the British and the French empires to mandates and spheres of influence with France accorded the mandate for Syria including Lebanon (yes, a hundred years ago the Lebanese called themselves Syrians but that’s another story) and Britain those for Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine.
 
According to Syria’s official history, the French proceeded with a deliberate policy of “divide and conquer” right from the start. “Divide” the French indeed did. Syria was partitioned into 6 different entities: the States of Aleppo, Damascus, Jabal Druze, Jibal il Alawiin, Greater Lebanon, and Alexandretta. Alexandretta was later ceded to Turkey and Lebanon (enlarged by 4 “Syrian” districts) was kept separate even after administrative and financial considerations convinced the French of the desirability of unifying the remaining 4 “states” into one “Syria”.

In their political and administrative divisions, the French emphasized the religious differences in Syria. I say "emphasized" for certainly they did not create those differences. The Maronite Christians were given Lebanon (enlarged by the aforementioned “Syrian” districts to make it economically viable), The Alawites were made “independent” and so were the Druze, whereas the rival cities of Aleppo and Damascus were each granted its own realm. The partition, to be sure, had many flaws as was bound to happen in an ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse country the way Syria was and still is. For example there was an important Kurdish concentration in al Jazeera whereas Syria’s Christians were too scattered across the emerging country to be granted their own dominion. The French probably debated those issues and more but could not come-up with a palatable remedy. They realized and so did their embittered Syrian subjects that the division was artificial but reckoned that it would be well nigh impossible to come up with a solution that satisfies everyone and did not suspect at the time that they would soon be evicted from the Levant and lose control over the subsequent development of their creatures.

Syria achieved its long coveted independence in the 1940’s. Alexandretta and Lebanon were lost, it is true, but the rest of the country somehow remained in one piece and was now a full fledged state, a member of the United Nations, and governed by its own people. Its borders, with the exception of the Golan Height that was lost to Israel in 1967, have seemingly stabilized and acquired permanence through the recognition of its neighbors as well as the international community. Those borders, however, have ever been denounced by Syrian patriots of different political orientations as artificially imposed by foreigners. For better or for worse, Syrians kept looking beyond their borders in search of a Greater Syria, a Fertile Crescent, an Arab Nation, etc. Generations of Syrians were maintained on an ambitious but imaginary diet of a Syria that never was.

Fast forward to March 2011 when the fever of the so called “Arab Spring” reached Syria. Once more it is not my intention to elaborate on Syria’s simmering civil war as the final chapter in that sad narrative is yet to be written and I fear we’re in for a long ride. What I would like to point out (which is the central theme of this essay) is the increasingly ethnic-sectarian nature of the current strife. Whereas our parents and grandparents incessantly raised the banner of Arab or Syrian union, a sizable part (some think a majority) of the current generation appears hopelessly divided along sectarian lines and utterly bent on settling scores and pursuing vendettas. Some have even gone to the extent of asking help from the same “colonial” powers that our grandparents denouced and “evicted”.

But is any of this surprising? Well it shouldn’t. One only needs to look next door at the Lebanese and (most recently) Iraqi models. Of course in both models outside intervention played a crucial (in Iraq’s case a decisive) role but there is no denying that the soil was fertile with sectarian hatred that was bound to explode with outright war comes a timely stimulus. More to the point, if tiny Lebanon can plunge into a bloody civil war for almost a generation why wouldn’t Syria, several times Lebanon’s size area as well as population-wise and just as complex from ethnic and religious standpoints?

Are Syria’s borders artificial? Absolutely! But this can be interpreted in two diametrically opposite manners and an inescapable conclusion would be that the French may have created a Syria that is too large for its own good after all. Why not re-partition Syria, give the Kurds the Northeast, the Druze the Southwest, the Alawis the coast, well you got the idea… It may not sound pretty but it definitely is better than endless fighting and bloodshed and it sure hell beats any “humanitarian” military intervention by the cynical western powers and a NATO that all but outlived its usefullness. If, and that’s a big if, it could be done peacefully..

I don’t know what the solution is. I don’t know if a reasonably accepted solution even exists. Anyone who practiced Medicine long enough knows that not all diseases are curable the “miracles” of modern science and technology notwithstanding. Can Syria be kept in one piece with no recourse to using overwhelming force? Would a day dawn on this tormented land when Syrians love their country, however artificially created, more than they distrust and resent each other?

Syrians are notorious for talking the talk: there has never been a shortage of sycophants singing Syria’s praises and professing an everlasting love for their fatherland but what is needed more urgently than ever would be responsible leaders and enlightened citizenry for walking the walk. Syria needs less poetry and more action. Goneril and Regan proffered undying, boundless, and indescribable love for their senile old father but when push came to shove king Lear could only rely on the quiet love of his sweet Cordelia.
 
 

Sunday, April 3, 2011

The Younger Assad Crosses the Rubicon


   Syria was in turmoil when I arrived in Damascus shortly after the Ides of March 2011. Demonstrators in Deraa spearheaded a movement demanding nothing less than comprehensive reforms including- but not limited to- removal of emergency laws, releasing political prisoners, clamping down on corruption, and dismissing venal officials. Some even raised sectarian banners and questioned the very legitimacy of the President. Within days various regions in the country joined the upheaval and the regime appeared more than ever on the defensive, fighting for its very survival.

   Assad Senior faced a similar uprising 3 decades ago that culminated in the Hama Massacre of 1982 when he unleashed his armed forces on the city killing thousands of people and leveling the center of the old town. Back then such wholesale repression was facilitated by a multiplicity of factors: Syria then enjoyed the protection of the still mighty Soviet Empire, her armed forces were in a much better shape, and there was no Facebook, Internet, cell phones, or satellite TV. No photographs, let alone video clips, leaked out to tell the gruesome tale. Assad was brutal but efficient. The Hama Massacre guaranteed his reign till the closure of the 20th Century and provided for a smooth transmission of power to his son in the Year 2000.

   Assad Junior possessed none of the above advantages. The Syria of 2011 was surrounded by enemies. To the South loomed Israel and Jordan, to the East US-occupied Iraq, and to the West a Lebanon that no longer hosted the Syrian armed forces. Regionally Saudi Arabia pursued a policy that targeted the Syria-Iran axis and globally the USA targeted Assad with sanctions whereas the Soviet Union was no more. Economically Syria suffered from poverty, widening gap between rich and poor, dilapidated infrastructure, depleted oil reserves, water shortage, and overpopulation.

   Assad Junior could no longer let loose the army against the opposition without risking the wrath of the USA and NATO as the case in Libya amply demonstrated but at the same time he had to be proactive and shun the half-hearted incremental measures that sealed the fate of Tunisia’s president and Egypt’s despot. Bahrain’s monarch was luckier but he enjoyed the favor and protection of a global as well as a regional hegemon (the USA & Saudi Arabia, respectively) which was far from being the case for Assad. The crisis called for tact and discretion as to avoid repeating the mistakes that doomed other Arab dictators. Could Syria’s master pull a rabbit out of his worn-out hat?

   To be sure Assad possessed some advantages. Contrary to his Egyptian colleague, he still had the army as well as the security apparatuses firmly lined up behind him. Most Alawis, and many Sunnis still supported him. The former to preserve their acquired advantages and the latter to avoid chaos and sectarian strife Iraqi-style that would likely follow reversal of fortunes. Christians certainly were in no mood to have Muslim extremists topple a relatively secular Alawi rule and so were probably Druze and Ismailis. Apart from the Kurds, minorities would by and large support Assad each for its own reasons.

   Left to his own devices, Assad surely has more pluses than minuses and would probably not have much more difficulty suppressing the uprisings than his old man did 30 years ago but the simple truth was that he could no longer count on outsiders leaving him in “peace”. Anyway not after witnessing the USAF pounding Libya in company of the British and the French. His options were sharply reduced to finding the magic formula of enough repression to intimidate the rebels without reaching the irreversible step as to invite outside intervention.
 
   For more than a week, Assad dealt with the opposition with relative restrain avoiding large scale bloodshed and leaving the task of keeping order to the police and security apparatuses. The army surrounded Deraa, to be sure, but stopped short of deploying its guns. He moreover delegated his spokesperson, Dr. Buthaina Shaaban to announce imminent reforms promising to increase the salaries of government employees. Assad even released some political prisoners and let it be known that he would be addressing the Syrian Nation soon. He was biding his time and prudently avoided commitment to a course of action before he could reasonably estimate its consequences.

   The proverbial light at the end of the tunnel appeared on March 27th as Ms. Clinton, the US Secretary of State, called Assad “a reformer “ essentially ruling out military intervention against Syria. To be sure there was no shortage of condemnation of using violence against civilians by different influential figures in the US administration and Congress but Assad could safely ignore verbal attacks stripped of military force or the threat of using it. Ms. Clinton delivered precisely what he was asking for and he could, at least for the time being, afford to talk and act with far more confidence than would be the case of someone under an American-made Sword of Damocles. Instructions were given to the powers that be to organize huge demonstrations in support of the regime with tens of thousands filling the streets of major Syrian cities waving and repeating resurrected worn-out slogans of undying loyalty to the president.

   Thus emboldened, on March 30th, Assad delivered his long awaited address to the obsequious People’s Assembly in Damascus. The speech blamed the disturbances on outside conspiracies and made no real concessions to the people’s demands, a few vague promises notwithstanding. It was a triumphant speech received by standing ovation from a dependable audience and interrupted here and there by deputies outdoing each other in flattery and brown nosing as Assad appeared and sounded more relaxed than ever. It was veni, vidi, vici as Assad donned the mantle of Julius Caesar.