Syria was in turmoil when I arrived in Damascus shortly after the Ides of March 2011. Demonstrators in Deraa spearheaded a movement demanding nothing less than comprehensive reforms including- but not limited to- removal of emergency laws, releasing political prisoners, clamping down on corruption, and dismissing venal officials. Some even raised sectarian banners and questioned the very legitimacy of the President. Within days various regions in the country joined the upheaval and the regime appeared more than ever on the defensive, fighting for its very survival.
Assad Senior faced a similar uprising 3 decades ago that culminated in the Hama Massacre of 1982 when he unleashed his armed forces on the city killing thousands of people and leveling the center of the old town. Back then such wholesale repression was facilitated by a multiplicity of factors: Syria then enjoyed the protection of the still mighty Soviet Empire, her armed forces were in a much better shape, and there was no Facebook, Internet, cell phones, or satellite TV. No photographs, let alone video clips, leaked out to tell the gruesome tale. Assad was brutal but efficient. The Hama Massacre guaranteed his reign till the closure of the 20th Century and provided for a smooth transmission of power to his son in the Year 2000.
Assad Junior possessed none of the above advantages. The Syria of 2011 was surrounded by enemies. To the South loomed Israel and Jordan, to the East US-occupied Iraq, and to the West a Lebanon that no longer hosted the Syrian armed forces. Regionally Saudi Arabia pursued a policy that targeted the Syria-Iran axis and globally the USA targeted Assad with sanctions whereas the Soviet Union was no more. Economically Syria suffered from poverty, widening gap between rich and poor, dilapidated infrastructure, depleted oil reserves, water shortage, and overpopulation.
Assad Junior could no longer let loose the army against the opposition without risking the wrath of the USA and NATO as the case in Libya amply demonstrated but at the same time he had to be proactive and shun the half-hearted incremental measures that sealed the fate of Tunisia’s president and Egypt’s despot. Bahrain’s monarch was luckier but he enjoyed the favor and protection of a global as well as a regional hegemon (the USA & Saudi Arabia, respectively) which was far from being the case for Assad. The crisis called for tact and discretion as to avoid repeating the mistakes that doomed other Arab dictators. Could Syria’s master pull a rabbit out of his worn-out hat?
To be sure Assad possessed some advantages. Contrary to his Egyptian colleague, he still had the army as well as the security apparatuses firmly lined up behind him. Most Alawis, and many Sunnis still supported him. The former to preserve their acquired advantages and the latter to avoid chaos and sectarian strife Iraqi-style that would likely follow reversal of fortunes. Christians certainly were in no mood to have Muslim extremists topple a relatively secular Alawi rule and so were probably Druze and Ismailis. Apart from the Kurds, minorities would by and large support Assad each for its own reasons.
Left to his own devices, Assad surely has more pluses than minuses and would probably not have much more difficulty suppressing the uprisings than his old man did 30 years ago but the simple truth was that he could no longer count on outsiders leaving him in “peace”. Anyway not after witnessing the USAF pounding Libya in company of the British and the French. His options were sharply reduced to finding the magic formula of enough repression to intimidate the rebels without reaching the irreversible step as to invite outside intervention.
For more than a week, Assad dealt with the opposition with relative restrain avoiding large scale bloodshed and leaving the task of keeping order to the police and security apparatuses. The army surrounded Deraa, to be sure, but stopped short of deploying its guns. He moreover delegated his spokesperson, Dr. Buthaina Shaaban to announce imminent reforms promising to increase the salaries of government employees. Assad even released some political prisoners and let it be known that he would be addressing the Syrian Nation soon. He was biding his time and prudently avoided commitment to a course of action before he could reasonably estimate its consequences.
The proverbial light at the end of the tunnel appeared on March 27th as Ms. Clinton, the US Secretary of State, called Assad “a reformer “ essentially ruling out military intervention against Syria. To be sure there was no shortage of condemnation of using violence against civilians by different influential figures in the US administration and Congress but Assad could safely ignore verbal attacks stripped of military force or the threat of using it. Ms. Clinton delivered precisely what he was asking for and he could, at least for the time being, afford to talk and act with far more confidence than would be the case of someone under an American-made Sword of Damocles. Instructions were given to the powers that be to organize huge demonstrations in support of the regime with tens of thousands filling the streets of major Syrian cities waving and repeating resurrected worn-out slogans of undying loyalty to the president.
Thus emboldened, on March 30th, Assad delivered his long awaited address to the obsequious People’s Assembly in Damascus. The speech blamed the disturbances on outside conspiracies and made no real concessions to the people’s demands, a few vague promises notwithstanding. It was a triumphant speech received by standing ovation from a dependable audience and interrupted here and there by deputies outdoing each other in flattery and brown nosing as Assad appeared and sounded more relaxed than ever. It was veni, vidi, vici as Assad donned the mantle of Julius Caesar.
